Growth paths and routes to exit : ‘Shadow of Death’ effects for new firms in Japan by Coad Alex & 加藤 雅俊
Growth paths and routes to exit : ‘Shadow of
Death’ effects for new firms in Japan
page range 1-42
year 2019-01
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10236/00027496
 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion paper No. 185 
 
 
Growth paths and routes to exit: 
‘Shadow of Death’ effects for new firms in Japan 
 
Alex Coad 
(CENTRUM Catolica Graduate Business School, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú) 
Masatoshi Kato 
(School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University) 
 
January 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
KWANSEI GAKUIN UNIVERSITY 
 
1-155 Uegahara Ichiban-cho 
Nishinomiya 662-8501, Japan 
1 
 
 
Growth paths and routes to exit: 
‘Shadow of Death’ effects for new firms in Japan 
 
Alex Coad† 
Masatoshi Kato‡ 
 
This version: 31 December 2018 
 
ABSTRACT 
Research has recently emphasized that the non-survival of entrepreneurs can be disaggregated into distinct 
exit routes such as merger and acquisition (M&A), voluntary closure and failure. Firm performance is an alleged 
determinant of exit route. However, there is a lack of evidence linking exit routes to their previous growth 
performance. We contribute to this gap by analysing a cohort of incorporated firms in Japan, and find some puzzles 
for the standard view. In the Japanese context, not all exit routes are available to all firms: small firms do not 
realistically face the options of M&A or bankruptcy, but essentially face a choice between survival and voluntary 
liquidation. Our empirical analysis suggests that sales growth generally reduces the probability of exit by merger, 
voluntary liquidation, and also bankruptcy. However, the relationship is U-shaped - such that rapid growth actually 
increases the probability of exit. More generally, each of the three exit routes can occur all across the growth rate 
distribution. Large firms are more likely to exit via merger or bankruptcy, while small firms are more likely to exit 
via voluntary liquidation. 
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1. Introduction 
There is increasing awareness that the exits of firms and entrepreneurs are not all failures (Headd, 2003; Harada, 
2007). An early investigation by Schary (1991) breaks down the phenomenon of firm exit into several exit routes: 
merger, voluntary liquidation, and bankruptcy.  Relatedly, Wennberg et al. (2010) focus on the determinants of 
four different entrepreneurial exit routes: (1) harvest sale, (2) distress sale. (3) harvest liquidation, and (4) distress 
liquidation.  
Although previous theorizing has suggested that performance is an important determinant of a firm’s available exit 
choices, previous research has not investigated in great depth the role of pre-exit growth on exit routes. For 
example, the influential paper by Wennberg et al. (2010) controls for several founder and firm characteristics, but 
not for pre-exit growth. One might expect that rapid-growth firms can achieve IPOs (initial public offerings) and 
lucrative offers for acquisition, while low-growth or declining firms are more prone to bankruptcy. However, rapid 
growth may be associated with failure, if rapid growth firms struggle to balance their costs and revenues (Zhou et 
al., 2012; Pe’er et al., 2016; Coad et al., 2017). Voluntary exit might be unrelated to the previous growth 
performance, e.g. if individual’s decisions to retire are independent of the firm’s sales performance, or voluntary 
exit might be negatively related to previous growth performance, e.g. if voluntary exit depends on satisfaction with 
business performance. We argue that these intuitions and expectations deserve proper investigation. 
We focus on ‘shadow of death’ effects on exit routes: in particular, how sales growth - in the years immediately 
before exit - varies across exit routes. Griliches and Regev (1995) introduce the ‘shadow of death’ effect with their 
finding that firm productivity is low in the years before exit. Almus (2004, p199) reports that German SMEs have 
lower growth rates when there is “the shadow of death sneaking around the corner” (p199). Subsequent research 
has investigated the shadow of death effect for productivity (Blanchard et al., 2014; Carreira and Teixeira, 2011; 
Koski and Pajarinen, 2015), pre-exit employment (Fackler et al., 2014), and firm performance before a succession 
event (Diwisch et al., 2006) or a merger (Kubo and Saito, 2012).1 Kiyota and Takizawa (2007), Kubo and Saito 
(2012) and Yamakawa and Cardon (2017) investigate shadow of death effects in Japan. However, only few studies 
                                                            
1 Closely related to our current research is the work that has briefly investigated the performance of Japanese firms in the 2 
years before a merger event (Kubo and Saito, 2012, see their Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 1). 
3 
 
have investigated whether shadow of death effects apply to new ventures, and there is a genuine gap in the literature 
regarding shadow of death effects and firm exit routes. Growth and survival are two of the most important 
indicators of new firm performance (Miller et al., 2013). We begin with a theoretical discussion that leads to clear 
and novel predictions for the ‘standard model’ of exit routes, whereby there is a ‘pecking order’ of exit routes, 
with IPO as the most desirable, followed by M&A, then voluntary liquidation, and with bankruptcy as the least 
favorable option. Firms with a better growth performance in recent years are eligible for more desirable exit routes. 
However, in reality, not all exit routes are equally available to firms with different characteristics (e.g. with 
different sizes). Nevertheless, the disparate availabilities of exit routes to firms of different sizes has received little 
attention in previous research. In the Japanese context, we discuss that voluntary liquidation is the most relevant 
exit route for small firms, while large firms are more likely to undergo mergers or bankruptcies. We contribute to 
the empirical literature by considering how exit routes are related to previous sales growth.  
The findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. Our empirical analysis indicates that sales growth in the 
years before exit is a significant predictor of exit routes. Non-parametric graphs and statistics, as well as 
multinomial logistic and complementary log-log regressions, suggest that lagged sales growth generally reduces 
the probability of exit by merger, voluntary liquidation, and also bankruptcy. However, the relationship is U-
shaped - such that rapid growth actually increases the probability of exit. More generally, each of the three exit 
routes can occur all across the growth rate distribution. Large firms are more likely to exit via merger or bankruptcy, 
while small firms are more likely to exit via voluntary liquidation. 
The paper begins with a theoretical discussion (Section 2) before presenting our data (Section 3). Non-parametric 
analyses in Section 4 provide a detailed first impression of the relationships between growth and exit, for the 
various exit routes. Parametric regressions in Section 5 complement our non-parametric results by including 
control variables and investigating statistical significance. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Background and hypotheses development 
2.1 Standard view on exit routes 
Research into firm survival has emphasized that there are several distinct exit routes available to entrepreneurs: 
“entrepreneurs are busy examining varying exit routes” (Wennberg and DeTienne, 2014, p5).  Entrepreneurs make 
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a “conscious selection of exit strategy from among multiple options” (DeTienne and Cardon, 2012, p352). 
Entrepreneurs face a menu of exit options, among which they make their choices depending on their preferences 
and degree of risk-taking. Ambitious entrepreneurs who are open to risk-taking might aim for an IPO or M&A 
exit, while more risk-averse entrepreneurs may have more modest exit strategies (such as planning for a voluntary 
liquidation). “The exit path that an entrepreneur chooses is important because different paths provide different 
levels of risk (and thereby potential reward), complexity, and level of potential entrepreneurial engagement after 
exit.” (DeTienne and Cardon, 2012, p355).  
Instead of treating exit as a dichotomous variable, the exit routes featured in previous studies include: initial public 
offerings (IPO), mergers and acquisitions, management buy-outs, employee buy-outs, sale to a third party, sale to 
another business, voluntary or involuntary liquidation and bankruptcy (Wennberg and DeTienne, 2014, Coad, 
2014).2  
These exit routes can be arranged into some sort of ‘pecking order’ according to their desirability, according to 
what we might call the ‘standard view’. The best available option for an entrepreneurial exit is an IPO, or a lucrative 
acquisition (Wennberg et al., 2010, Arora and Nandkumar, 2011). Some scholars highlight firm exit via acquisition 
as a strategic goal towards which firms aspire, and that they actively court (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004; 
Villalonga and McGahan, 2005; Cefis and Marsili, 2012). Hence, firms seeking an exit, might first aim for a 
merger or acquisition (M&A), and if that is not possible, either survive or go for voluntary liquidation. Voluntary 
liquidations can be a satisfying means for an entrepreneur to exit a business. Examples of voluntary liquidation 
include a founder’s retirement, a desired career change, or their withdrawal from the business due to illness or 
injury (Harada, 2007; Wennberg et al., 2010). Beyond a certain point, however, perhaps survival and voluntary 
liquidation are no longer possible, and bankruptcy may be the only option. Bankruptcy is a forced closure, the 
entrepreneur makes no financial gain from the enterprise and may face stiff legal consequences (especially in 
Japan). If things get so bad that the firm approaches bankruptcy, there may be no option but to quickly seek a 
distress sale or to voluntarily liquidate or to survive by some radical restructuring of businesses practices. Indeed, 
bankruptcy is at the bottom of the pecking order. 
                                                            
2 The literature has even invented the concept of an “involuntary exit strategy”, although we doubt that something truly 
strategic can also be involuntary. 
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We therefore consider that firms compete for their preferred exit route, with the best-performing firms achieving 
the most desirable exits, and firms with worse performance experiencing relatively unattractive exits. Wennberg 
and DeTienne (2014, p5) write that “performance has an important impact on potential exit routes, the development 
of exit strategies and the process of entrepreneurial exit (Wennberg et al., 2010).” Therefore, “if researchers wish 
to empirically test the likelihood of exit, they also need to control for performance (e.g. earnings from self-
employment on the individual level or with profitability measures on the firm level), which otherwise would 
constitute a severe case of omitted variable bias.” (Wennberg and DeTienne, 2014, p12). In the present study, we 
measure performance in terms of a firm’s growth path in the years immediately before exit. Sales growth is one of 
the main indicators of firm performance (Miller et al., 2013). Firms facing positive sales growth would be expected 
to exit via more attractive routes than firms with declining sales.  
To summarize, then, entrepreneurs and their firms can initially choose between a ‘multitude’ of exit routes that are 
available to them. However, the exit route that they take depends on their relative performance in the years before 
exit. The best performing firms, i.e. those with positive sales growth, are more likely to exit via IPO or M&A, 
while firms with declining sales are more likely to exit via bankruptcy. Firms with stagnant sales are more likely 
to exit via voluntary liquidation. These notions are represented in Figure 1.  
In the standard view on exit routes, entering firms are characterized by their initial size. Initial size might well 
proxy for the entrepreneur’s aspiration level. If a firm’s size (e.g. in terms of sales or employees) decreases after 
entry, this could be perceived as unsatisfactory, because firm size ends up below the entrepreneur’s aspiration 
level. Conversely, if firm size increases after entry, this is probably encouraging, because the firm is above its 
aspiration level. Some fortunate firms will grow after entry, and these firms are more likely to survive. In contrast, 
firms that perform badly in terms of post-entry growth are more likely to exit, and in the context of economic 
models of industry evolution, exit is interpreted as a failure (Jovanovic, 1982; Levinthal, 1991; Le Mens et al., 
2011; Coad et al., 2013).  
Firms may have more control over their entry size than their post-entry growth. Many models of industry evolution 
consider that post-entry growth is determined by a series of unanticipated shocks that are beyond the control of 
the entrepreneur (in accordance with Gibrat’s Law and Gambler’s Ruin theory, see e.g. Levinthal 1991; Le Mens 
et al., 2011; Storey, 2011; Coad et al., 2013). These models can be generalized to take into account that 
6 
 
entrepreneurs have different exit thresholds, such that what might be considered as a satisfactory post-entry growth 
performance for one entrepreneur can be considered as unsatisfactory for another entrepreneur who has attractive 
outside options (Gimeno et al., 1997; DeTienne et al., 2015). These models can also be generalized to take into 
account that entrepreneurs face a variety of exit routes. The most ‘successful’ entrepreneurs (i.e. those with rapid 
post-entry growth: Jovanovic, 1982, Levinthal, 1991, Le Mens et al., 2011) may aspire for the most favorable exit 
routes, such as IPO or a lucrative acquisition, and these exit routes may even be preferable to regular survival. 
However, post-entry growth depends on a multitude of factors (developing production routines and capabilities, 
hiring employees, accumulating a customer base, building a brand through marketing, balancing the finances, etc) 
such that post-entry growth is overall largely unpredictable, and even if entrepreneurs have plans for their exit 
route, they may not be able to fulfil these ambitions. Few firms would plan to go bankrupt, but bankruptcies often 
happen. Firms may plan to experience a successful exit (IPO or trade sale), but these optimistic plans are somewhat 
out of their control, and depend on the realized post-entry growth. Hence, considering that entrepreneurs may have 
little control over their actual post-entry growth performance (Storey, 2011), the primary determinant of exit route 
is not necessarily the planned exit strategy, but rather the realized post-entry growth performance.  
Overall, the standard view would consider that: 
Proposition 1: Successful firms have persistent post-entry growth and are more likely to exit via M&A or IPO 
 
Proposition 2: Firms with a mediocre post-entry growth performance (neither persistent growth nor persistent 
decline) are more likely to exit via voluntary liquidation 
 
Proposition 3: Unsuccessful firms that have persistent decline in the years after entry are more likely to exit via 
bankruptcy 
 
Proposition 2, in particular, is not precisely defined: Entrepreneurs who engage in voluntary liquidation might 
report feeling satisfied with their outcome (Strese et al., 2018). This is because perceived exit performance is not 
always evaluated solely in terms of personal financial benefits, but exit performance may also be measured in 
terms of other performance dimensions such as personal reputation, employee benefits, and firm mission 
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persistence (Strese et al., 2018). Contrarily, if a business exit is framed as a successful event, this could be due to 
an entrepreneur’s optimism, and a desire to ‘snatch victory from the jaws of defeat,’ rather than an objective 
evaluation with regard to the venture’s initial goals (Marlow et al., 2011; Coad, 2014). Ries (2011) writes that 
entrepreneurs may be quick to repackage a failure as a ‘learning experience’, irrespective of whether any learning 
actually took place, to save face and to keep up good appearances in front of investors. We therefore consider it to 
be an interesting empirical question to see if voluntary liquidations are closer to bankruptcies or to M&As. 
2.2 The Japanese context on exit routes  
A drawback of the standard model is that not all exit routes are relevant for all firms at the same time. The reality 
is more complex. To suggest that firms have a choice between exit routes (such as M&A, voluntary liquidation, 
and failure) is like supposing that people have a choice between getting married, entering retirement, or dying of 
a drug overdose. Yes, people face these choices, but they tend not to be susceptible to all options at the same time. 
Firms engaging in different exit routes differ quite clearly in terms of characteristics such as size. Hence, not all 
possible exit routes will be simultaneously available to all firms, because the availability of exit routes depends on 
a firm’s circumstances.3 In Cefis and Marsili (2012, Table 1) firms that exit by M&A have about twice as many 
employees, on average, as those that exit via failure, and about half as many employees as those that exit via 
restructuring. 
Another limitation is that the standard view on exit routes cannot be directly applied to the Japanese case, because 
the exit routes have different meanings in the Japanese institutional context. For example, bankruptcy is 
prohibitively punitive for small firms, and many acquisition events are ‘rescue mergers’. Broadly speaking, all of 
our observed exit routes (merger, voluntary liquidation, and bankruptcy) are considered as ‘bad news’ in the 
Japanese context, because they are closer to failures than successes. Indeed, exit routes have different meanings in 
different cultural and institutional contexts (Wennberg and DeTienne, 2014). We now modify the standard 
conceptualization of exit routes to incorporate some specificities of the Japanese context. 
                                                            
3 To be fair, this idea has been hinted at in the previous literature, e.g. Wennberg and DeTienne (2014, p9): “the type of exit 
routes available and the willingness to exit may differ significantly between lifestyle entrepreneurs and growth entrepreneurs.” 
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In our dataset, the exit routes are merger, voluntary liquidation, bankruptcy, as well as a small number of cases of 
IPO. In the following subsections, we discuss the cases of M&A, voluntary liquidation, and bankruptcy, in the 
Japanese context. Japan has bank-based rather than equity-based finance for new ventures. IPOs are quite rare, 
especially for firms (such as those in our sample) aged less than 10 years.  
2.2.1 Mergers and acquisitions in Japan 
The desirability of selling the firm in the context of an acquisition is not always clearcut. Wennberg et al., (2010) 
distinguish between a harvest sale and a distress sale. Successful firms get acquired, in which case we would expect 
rapid sales growth in the years before acquisition. However, distress sales (i.e. acquisition of underperforming 
firms that are being badly managed) also occur, in which case we would expect a disappointing sales growth in 
the years before acquisition.  
M&As in Japan differ in nature compared to M&As in the USA. Indeed, the significance of merger events varies 
across countries (Kubo and Saito, 2012). Successful exit strategies via M&A are much rarer in Japan than in, for 
example, the USA (Honjo and Nagaoka, 2018). M&As in Japan vary a lot over the business cycle, while 
bankruptcy is more constant over the business cycle (Kiyota and Takizawa, 2007, Figure 1), and M&As in Japan 
are countercyclical, whereas in the USA they are procyclical (Mehrotra et al., 2008). This is because M&As occur 
to salvage distressed firms, rather than aggressive expansion during economic booms. These are usually not 
considered to be successful outcomes. In the Japanese context, the term ‘rescue merger’ is often used (Ito, 2011; 
Kubo and Saito, 2012) to refer to situations where a merger is set up to recover a distressed firm, after a 
disappointing performance in the latter that may be due to indisputable mismanagement or incontrovertible 
strategic mistakes. Indeed, there are many “rescue mergers” in Japan, more so than elsewhere. In some countries, 
the category ‘M&A’ refers primarily to acquisitions (e.g., Cefis and Marsili, 2012, footnote 4), but in our data, 
M&A refers primarily to (rescue) mergers. For large firms in Japan, survival is generally considered to be the best 
outcome.  
M&A events usually involve large firms, not small firms. Small firms in Japan simply do not engage in M&A. 
According to the Annual Report on Japanese Start-up Business 2016 by Venture Enterprise Center, the number of 
M&As as an exit mode is much smaller than that of IPOs for Japanese start-ups.  
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2.2.2 Voluntary liquidation in Japan 
In Japan, as elsewhere, there may be a variety of reasons of voluntary liquidation. For example, some managers 
may want to dissolve their businesses before facing insolvency because they recognize that their businesses are no 
longer going well (e.g. if sales are in decline). Other managers may be forced to close their companies because 
they are approaching retirement age and cannot find any successor. In addition, managers that have alternative 
employment opportunities with higher wages may voluntarily dissolve their businesses. Harada (2007) 
investigated the reasons for exits of small firms in Japan. The most important reason for voluntary exit was 
“despairing perception of further business” (Harada, 2007, Table 1). He found that while 40% of the exits are 
economically driven, others are not caused by economic reasons. Among a variety of non-economic-forced exits, 
aging of managers is the most common reason for exit, followed by illness or injury of the manager.  
Perhaps the largest difference in the meaning of voluntary liquidation in Japan, compared to other countries, is that 
bankruptcy of small businesses is very rare, and therefore the category of voluntary liquidation could include a 
larger proportion of unsuccessful businesses (‘almost bankruptcies’) that are closed shortly before bankruptcy.  
2.2.3 Bankruptcy in Japan 
In Japan, there are some cases that firms without solvency applied for court protection under the Bankruptcy Law, 
as well as those applied for it under the Corporate Rehabilitation Law, and the Civil Rehabilitation Law enacted 
in April 2000 in Japan. In addition, firms whose bills are no longer honored by banks are regarded as bankruptcy 
even if they are not necessarily judged as bankruptcy by a court. Not only firms legally declared as bankrupt, but 
also inactive firms from an economic viewpoint, are regarded as bankrupt in Japan. In general, firms try to avoid 
this, for example, by declaring voluntary liquidation before they get to the point of bankruptcy. Large companies 
can afford bankruptcy, which is a process that involves additional costs and takes time which have a considerable 
fixed-cost component, but bankruptcy is not a reasonable option for small firms (Harada, 2007). Since bankruptcy 
has strong legal implications, small firms do everything they can to avoid it (Kato and Honjo, 2015), and they 
usually opt for voluntary liquidation instead (Harhoff et al., 1998).  
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To summarize, in the Japanese context, survival is the best option for large firms as well as small firms. For small 
firms, acquisitions as a successful strategic exit are rare in Japan, rarer than exit via IPO, and rescue mergers are 
not relevant if the firm is small. Small firms seek to avoid bankruptcy at all costs. Instead, the only appealing exit 
option for small firms would be voluntary liquidation. For large firms, rescue mergers can be a useful option to 
sell their assets if the firm encounters difficulties, and bankruptcy is the worst possible outcome. For large firms, 
voluntary liquidation is not really an option, because it essentially involves selling the (huge collection of) assets 
in a deal that would resemble a rescue merger. 
Figure 2 summarizes the hypothesized exit routes available to small and large firms in the Japanese context.  
3. Data 
The data used in this study comes from COSMOS2 based on credit investigation by Teikoku Databank Ltd. (TDB). 
This data source covers more than half of incorporated firms in Japan. Sole proprietorships are not included in the 
dataset, because the credit investigation company relies on the ofﬁcial register of corporations and thus does not 
include sole proprietors. The sample is limited to joint-stock companies. Firms in the dataset are from 
manufacturing, software and information services, other services, movie and video production, and postal and 
telecommunication services sectors, and are founded between 2003 and 2010. The dataset includes information on 
the survival and exit of such firms from their year of entry until the end of 2013. Firms founded in 2003 are 
therefore visible in all periods until 2013 (unless they exit before 2013 and hence leave the sample early), while 
companies founded in 2010 are only included in the data for a maximum of 4 years (because the sample ends in 
2013).  
The data provides information not only on whether a firm exits, but also its exit route (merger, voluntary liquidation, 
and bankruptcy). However, some firms leave the sample during the observation period for a variety of reasons. 
For example, some firms refuse investigation by the credit investigation company. These firms are included in the 
sample until the year before censored. Besides information on survival and exit, this source provided information 
on founder-, firm-, industry-, and region-level characteristics, such as the founder’s educational background, the 
firm’s sales, industry code, and location. Previous work using the same database includes Kato et al. (2017). 
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As for exit route, we classify exits into three routes---merger, voluntary liquidation, and bankruptcy, using the 
classifications in COSMOS2. Merger describes the situation in which a firm disappears owing to a merger with 
another firm. Voluntary liquidation indicates the situation where firms voluntarily dissolve their businesses without 
insolvency. A number of reasons may exist for voluntary liquidation, although their precise definition can be 
difficult. Bankruptcy is the situation in which firms cannot repay their debt and thus cease operations, and includes 
firms that apply for court protection under the Bankruptcy Law, as well as those that apply for it under the 
Corporate Rehabilitation Law or the Civil Rehabilitation Law. Additionally, when banks stop providing credit to 
service bills payable, firms are considered bankrupt even in the absence of a court judgment.  That is, we here 
define bankruptcy to include not only firms legally declared bankrupt but also those that are inactive economically.  
Our data includes information on a firm’s annual sales, although these numbers for annual sales may be 
approximated by rounding. The credit investigation company asks the managers about the numbers for total annual 
sales, number of employees, profits etc, although the managers do not necessarily disclose the exact amount. So, 
the investigators usually attempt to obtain such information by a number of means, for example, by asking whether 
the number is same as the previous year. This explains why the number for sales is sometimes identical to the 
previous year (i.e. change of zero yen from one year to the next), and why we have a likely over-representation of 
annual growth rates of sales of exactly zero. 
4. Non-parametric analysis 
4.1 Summary statistics on exit routes 
Table 1 shows the exit events from the first year onwards.4 Exit events are generally quite rare in our data. Previous 
research has shown that up to 50% of firms exit after their first 3 years (e.g., Bartelsman et al., 2005; Coad, 2018). 
One reason for the low exit rate in our data is that COSMOS2 is based on the company register that does not include 
sole proprietorships. Our sample is limited to joint-stock companies that are relatively large compared to that used 
in previous literature. For none of the exit routes does the number of exit events peak in the first year. Exits in the 
                                                            
4 Note that the earliest years are not included in the regressions, because these observations are lost due to the inclusion of 
lagged growth as independent variable. 
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first year are rare for each of the three exit routes. Instead, an initial ‘honeymoon’ period is seen for each exit route. 
Merger and bankruptcy both peak in the 3rd year. Voluntary liquidation peaks in the 4th year.  
4.2 Exit events and firm size 
Figure 3 presents a preliminary non-parametric perspective on the relationship between exit routes and firm size, 
to investigate whether certain exit routes are more relevant for small firms or large firms (as highlighted in Figure 
2). Figure 3 shows how the exit routes vary according to size. The main finding is that the option of merger is only 
relevant for firms that are relatively large. Voluntary liquidation is more relevant for the smallest firms.  
4.3 Rapid growth and type of exit 
It is theoretically interesting to investigate whether the probability of survival varies over the growth rate 
distribution. Firms facing rapid decline may be more likely to exit on unfavorable terms. Growth may be positively 
related with survival, overall. However, excessive growth could lead to financial problems (such as difficulties in 
keeping a balance between incoming cashflow and rising costs), possibly suggesting that rapid growth could 
increase the likelihood of an exit on unfavorable terms. 
An important methodological choice relates to the relevant number of years of growth history. Are 2 years 
sufficient, or would 4 years be better? Or perhaps all years since start-up? There is a tradeoff between having 
longer growth history (fewer observations) and focusing on a shorter history (if longer lags are not significant). 
Overall, we select a model with 2 lags of annual growth rates, in keeping with previous literature (e.g., Kubo and 
Saito, 2012). The 3rd lag of sales growth is not statistically significant in our analysis. 
Figure B in the Appendix shows the growth rate distribution. Most firms have a growth rate of close to zero, 
although some firms have relatively rapid growth or decline, and the ‘tent-shape’ suggests a good fit to the Laplace 
(or symmetric exponential) density. Figure 4 shows that the probability of exit varies over the growth rate 
distribution.5 Bankruptcy is more likely for firms experiencing rapid decline, in line with expectations, although it 
is interesting that the probability of bankruptcy is positive across the growth rate distribution, such that even firms 
                                                            
5 Figure C in the Appendix shows (parametric) quadratic fits of the non-parametric patterns in Figure 4, including confidence 
intervals. Figure C therefore helps to establish that the observed nonlinearity is statistically significant. 
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with moderate or rapid growth are vulnerable to exit via bankruptcy. Indeed, even rapid-growth firms face risks 
of bankruptcy, if they struggle to maintain a balance between their costs and their incoming revenues (Brännback 
et al., 2014).   
The results for voluntary liquidation are similar to those for bankruptcy: exit routes are higher for firms 
experiencing rapid decline, but are positive across the growth rates distribution. With regards to merger, the 
probability of exit is remarkably constant across the growth rates distribution. It seems that exit by merger is quite 
unrelated to a firm’s recent growth performance. This is puzzling from the perspective of our theorizing in sections 
2.1 and 2.2. 
Figure 4 motivates the inclusion of a quadratic term for growth in our exit regressions, in keeping with previous 
studies (e.g. Zhou et al., 2012; Coad et al., 2017), because the relationship between growth and survival displays 
an inverted-U relationship, with a peak in the centre of the growth rate distribution.   
4.3 Growth paths analysis 
Table 2 below shows the pre-exit growth paths, and survival rates, for each exit route (following the methodology 
in Coad et al., 2013). Two consecutive periods of decline (below-median growth) are associated with highest 
frequencies of all exit events: merger, voluntary liquidation, and bankruptcy. The highest survival rates are 
associated with two consecutive periods of above-median growth for each of the exit routes. However, exits are 
observed for each configuration. Even firms with consistent above-average growth can sometimes exit via merger, 
voluntary liquidation, or bankruptcy. This is a reminder that bankruptcy is not necessarily brought on by decline, 
but instead it occurs because of an imbalance between revenues and costs.  
A potential limitation of this analysis in Table 2 is that we have many medians (growth=0). This is due to the 
nature of the data collection. Another concern is that the proportion of firms exiting is rather low, which is a 
limitation of the dataset, although previously published work has used this data to investigate firm survival and 
exit routes (e.g., Kato and Honjo, 2015, 2017). 
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5. Parametric analysis 
5.1 Regression analysis: all firms 
We examine the effects of lagged sales growth on subsequent survival according to exit route. We begin with a 
regression for all exit routes pooled together. This is done using a logit duration model (Wiklund, Baker, and 
Shepherd, 2010; Coad et al., 2013), where the dependent variable is a dummy variable for survival or non-survival. 
Our regressions for the competing risks of having different exit routes are done using discrete-time survival models 
in the form of multinomial logit regressions (Schary, 1991; Wennberg et al., 2010; Cefis and Marsili 2011, 2012; 
Ponikvar et al., 2018)6, where the dependent variable corresponds to either survival, or one of the three exit routes 
(merger, voluntary liquidation and bankruptcy).  
Our main independent variables of interest are lagged sales growth, including also the quadratic term because our 
non-parametric analysis (in Figure 4) suggested that the relationship between sales growth and exit is non-linear. 
We include a fairly standard set of control variables, in an attempt to control for possible confounding influences 
on the relationship between growth and exit route. These control variables include firm size (proxied by the 
logarithm of sales, including also its quadratic term), firm age, founder age (and its quadratic term), gender, and 
founder’s education; and also cohort, region and sector dummies. Table A in the Appendix presents information 
on the definitions of the variables, and Table B in the Appendix presents some summary statistics. Table C in the 
Appendix shows summary statistics for the independent variables according to exit status (survival, merger, 
voluntary liquidation, and bankruptcy).  
It is possible that one exit route will censor the firm from experiencing a different type of exit route. Hence, an 
assumption is that the probability of any exit route is independent of experiencing a competing exit route. This 
assumption has been made in the previous literature, and is especially reasonable in our case, because the 
probabilities of each exit route are all quite low (exit events are rare in our data).  
Table 3 reports the baseline regression results for pooled exit and different exit routes. Regarding lag selection, 
the results in Table 3 (both logit and multinomial logit) show that the second lag is statistically significant, but 
                                                            
6 For discussion of advantages of a discrete-time survival model, see Wiklund et al (2010). 
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further investigation shows that the 3rd and 4th lags are not significant (results not shown in detail here). It suggests, 
at least in our sample, that the growth history going back 2 years (not more) is sufficient to estimate a firm’s 
survival chances and exit route. In addition, the results suggest that there is a U-shaped relationship between lagged 
sales growth and exit. For lagged sales growth, log sales, and founder age, we confirmed that the peaked points in 
the U-shaped relationship fall in the relevant range based on the significant coefficients of linear and quadratic 
terms.7 
5.2 Regression analysis: small vs large firms 
The analysis in this subsection more directly tests the ideas in Figure 2. We distinguish between large and small 
firms in terms of whether they are above or below the median size (in terms of number of employees) in the first 
period of observation.8 Table D in the Appendix shows some summary statistics for the subsamples. 
Regression results in Table 4 show how lagged growth is associated with subsequent exit, when the different exit 
routes are pooled together. Table 5 presents multinomial logit regressions that show how lagged growth relates to 
the various exit routes. Both Tables 4 and 5 disaggregate by subsamples of below-median and above-median initial 
size. 
Table 4 shows that, overall, lagged growth is negatively associated with exit. Firms that grow are overall less likely 
to exit. In the subsample of below-median startup size firms, only the second lag is statistically significant. In the 
subsample of above-median size firms, the first lag is more strongly significant than the second, and there is some 
evidence of a U-shaped relation between growth rate and exit, in the subsample of large firms.  
Table 5 complements Table 4, by disaggregating according to exit route. For the subsample of below-median start-
up size firms, the second lag of growth is negatively associated with voluntary liquidation,9 while no such effect 
exists for the subsample of larger firms. This is consistent with our hypothesized relationship in Figure 2, because 
voluntary liquidation is an exit route that is more relevant for smaller firms, and that smaller firms can stave off 
                                                            
7 See Haans et al. (2016) for critical issues in theorizing and testing of quadratic relationships. 
8 There is no clear cut-off point to distinguish between small and large firms, because the firm size distribution in our sample 
is a continuous and approximately lognormal distribution (see Figure A in the Appendix). Therefore, we distinguish between 
small and large size subsamples by referring to the median size.  
9 This effect is only found in the specification without quadratic terms for the second lag of growth. When quadratic terms are 
added, the coefficient is no longer statistically significant.  
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this threat if they are able to grow. The growth rates of large firms are negatively associated with bankruptcy, 
which indicates that large firms that experience declining sales are particularly vulnerable to bankruptcy. No such 
linear effect was found for small firms, although a positive coefficient on the quadratic term for the second lag of 
growth suggests that small firms that have either rapid decline or excessively-fast growth are more likely to exit 
via bankruptcy. In addition, Table 5 shows some evidence that growth rate is negatively related to exit via merger 
in both subsamples.  
Finally, Table 5 shows that firm age reduces the probability of exit only in the case of exit by voluntary liquidation, 
not for the cases of bankruptcy or merger. Older firms are therefore less likely to exit by voluntary liquidation.  
The R2 statistics in Table 6 are quite low, ranging from 6% to 9%. Although we have found some interesting 
predictors of exit routes, nevertheless there is a lot of unexplained variation in exit routes.  
5.3 Growth measured since startup 
Our theoretical discussion suggested that, after a firm has entered an industry, its post-entry growth performance 
provides information on the exit routes available to entrepreneurs. Firms that consistently grew rapidly since entry 
may be eligible for a successful exit such as a lucrative M&A (or perhaps an IPO), whereas firms that declined 
since entry may be vulnerable to bankruptcy, or perhaps a voluntary liquidation on unfavorable terms. However, 
it was not theoretically clear whether it is a strong track record of consistently high growth since startup, or growth 
in the most recent years (which is the approach taken in the ‘shadow of death’ literature, e.g. Griliches and Regev, 
1995), that is the most important for exit routes.  
We therefore repeat our previous regressions with an alternative independent variable ‘growth since startup’ as a 
replacement for the first and second lags of a firm’s growth rate. ‘Growth since startup’ is calculated as the overall 
post-entry growth (i.e. the log-difference of final size and initial size), scaled down by the number of years. One 
potential drawback, however, of this alternative independent variable is that growth is measured over different 
growth periods across firms (e.g. time from startup to exit could be 2 years for one firm, and 6 years for another), 
and averaging over periods of different lengths could introduce bias. This could make it problematic to compare 
firms whose growth unfolds over different timescales (e.g. if rapid growth is harder to sustain over longer periods). 
This possible measurement error should be kept in mind.  
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Tables 6-8 present these regression results. The results for pooled exit in Table 6 show that the relationship between 
growth since startup and exit is nonlinear, with lower exit rates for firms with moderate post-entry growth rates 
(as opposed to extremely positive or negative growth). Multinomial logit regressions in Table 6 show that positive 
growth rates since startup will reduce the probability of an exit via merger. This suggests that exit via merger is an 
unfavorable exit route in our sample.  
Table 7 disaggregates by firm size (below-median vs above-median start-up size) and further investigates the 
relationship between post-entry growth and exit. Significant effects are found for above-median start-up size firms, 
where there is evidence of a U-shaped relationship between growth since start-up and exit. Amongst large firms, 
the lowest exit rates are found for firms with moderate growth.  
Table 8 disaggregates by exit routes, for the two size subsamples. For small firms, there is a statistically significant 
quadratic effect for post-entry growth and exit via bankruptcy, which seems to explain the quadratic effect for 
bankruptcy found in Table 6. Small firms are more likely to go bankrupt if they experience either rapid decline or 
rapid growth - instead moderate growth allows small firms to avoid bankruptcy. Table 8 also shows that growth 
since startup is negatively associated with exit via merger, in the subsample of relatively large firms.  
5.4 Robustness analysis 
The robustness of our results was verified in a number of ways. First, we explored whether longer lags of growth 
were significantly associated with exit routes. We repeated the regressions with 3rd and 4th lags of growth rates, 
but these longer lags were not statistically significant. Second, we repeated the analysis by dropping observations 
of sales growth in the first year, because of concern about possible partial year effects (Bernard et al, 2017). The 
results were qualitatively unchanged. Third, we complemented our multinomial logistic regressions with a 
complementary log-log model (Cefis and Marsili, 2012). The results, presented in Table E in the Appendix, are 
generally consistent with those using the multinomial logit model.  
Fourth, we attempt to correct for potentially large heterogeneity between startup experiences. A limitation of this 
database is the inability to distinguish between entry modes, such as comparing independent startups and spinoff 
startups. Spinoffs may well be expected to start larger than independent startups. Therefore, we check the 
robustness of our results after dropping the largest companies. Start-up size is approximately lognormally 
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distributed, with no clear threshold at which a distinct category of ‘large firms’ appears. We therefore undertake 
robustness analysis by dropping the largest 5% of firms. The results obtained are similar.  
6. Conclusion 
There is growing recognition that entrepreneurial exit events are not all failures, but that there are different 
categories of exit events, and that some correspond to successful ‘harvest’-type exits (e.g., Wennberg et al., 2010). 
These exit routes are assumed to depend on pre-exit performance. However, there is a lack of evidence on how 
firm performance evolves in the years immediately before exit, for different exit routes. Is it possible to detect 
early signals of whether a firm will be acquired or bankrupt? Can cases of voluntary liquidation be predicted in 
advance? We contribute to the literature by investigating how sales growth evolves in the years before exit.  
We begin by formulating what we call the ‘standard view’ on pre-exit growth across exit routes. According to this 
view, there is a ‘pecking order’ of exit strategies, chief among which is an IPO exit, followed by M&A, then 
voluntary liquidation, and the least desirable exit is via bankruptcy. Firms seek the best available exit, and firms 
with the best post-entry growth performance are more likely to experience more favorable exits. We then adjust 
this ‘standard model’ to the case of Japan. Indeed, we reiterate previous suggestions that the cultural and 
institutional context matters with regards to interpreting the significance of exit routes (Wennberg and DeTienne, 
2014). In the Japanese context, all of the exit routes (merger, voluntary liquidation, and bankruptcy) are generally 
considered to be ‘bad news’ - being closer to failure than to success.  
Sales growth in the recent past is more important for explaining exit routes than the average growth since startup. 
Our analysis suggests that focusing on the 2 years before exit is sufficient. Adding further lags does not help to 
significantly predict exit routes in our sample. Non-parametric graphs and statistics, as well as multinomial logistic 
and complementary log-log regressions, suggest that sales growth generally reduces the probability of exit by 
merger, voluntary liquidation, and also bankruptcy. However, the relationship is U-shaped - such that rapid growth 
actually increases the probability of exit. More generally, each of the three exit routes can occur all across the 
growth rate distribution. Large firms are more likely to exit via merger or bankruptcy, while small firms are more 
likely to exit via voluntary liquidation. Firm age reduces the probability of exit only in the case of exit by voluntary 
liquidation.  
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Our regressions therefore showed that some variables - chief among which is previous growth - help to explain a 
firm’s exit route. Overall, however, the predictive power of the regression models - as reflected by the pseudo-R2 
statistics of model fit - is rather low. We interpret this as evidence that firms are heterogeneous with regards to 
how their growth paths are linked to their exit strategies. Within the category of failed entrepreneurs, for example, 
there are heterogeneous subcategories each with their own behaviors and strategies (Khelil, 2016). Within the 
category of M&A, there are heterogeneous subcategories ranging from lucrative acquisitions of high-potential 
startups to fire-sale mergers of distressed corporate giants.    
Our analysis suggests that, overall, sales growth in the years before exit is a significant predictor of exit routes. 
Merger and voluntary liquidation are overall closer to ‘failures’ than successful exit strategies in our dataset and 
in our institutional context. Growing firms have overall lower chances of bankruptcy, as might be expected. Overall, 
the growth performance of firms can help predict which exit route a firm will take, taking into account that not all 
exit routes are relevant for all firms at the same time, and also that the interpretation of exit strategies differs across 
cultural and institutional contexts.  
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Figure 1: Conceptual diagram of the standard theoretical view of the relationships between post-entry growth and 
exit routes.  
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Figure 2: Simplified conceptual representation of the relationship between post-entry growth and exit routes in 
Japan.  
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Figure 3: Cumulative probability of log sales in period t for each exit route. 
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Figure 4: Survival rates for each exit route across the growth rates distribution. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics on the different exit routes by observation year. 
Exit route 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 8th year 9th year 10th year 11th year 
Merger 49 49 37 23 17 11 9 1 
Voluntary liquidation 70 39 26 21 4 2 1 2 
Bankruptcy 38 41 43 24 17 7 4 0 
Total # exits 157 129 106 68 38 20 14 3 
N at risk 5758 4796 3719 2668 1650 1039 537 71 
Note. IPO events are very rare and are therefore not included in our quantitative analyses. The numbers for IPOs 
are: 1 IPO event in the 4th year, 1 IPO in the 5th year, 2 IPOs in the 6th year, 2 IPOs in the 7th year, 3 IPOs in the 8th 
year, zero IPOs in the 9th year, 1 IPO in the 10th year, and zero IPOs in the 11th year.  
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Table 2. Growth paths and survival rates for each exit route. 
 Lagged sales growth 
   Survival rates 
   Merger  Voluntary liquidation  Bankruptcy 
Growth path 1 year lag 2 year lag  Obs.  % N  % N  % N 
1 + +  7006  99.3 51  99.3 48  99.2 53 
2 + -  6222  99.1 58  99.3 44  99.2 50 
3 - +  5849  99.1 55  99.0 56  99.1 51 
4 - -  6557  99.1 61  99.1 62  98.9 69 
 
Notes. + means above-median growth (including median). – indicates below-median growth (including median). 
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Table 3. Logistic and multinomial logit regression results for the full sample. 
Variable (i) Pooled exit 
(ii) 
Pooled exit  
(iii) 
Merger 
(iv) 
Voluntary 
liquidation 
(v) 
Bankruptcy 
 (vi) 
Merger 
(vii) 
Voluntary 
liquidation 
(viii) 
Bankruptcy 
1-year lagged growth -0.322*** -0.361***  -0.357** -0.316* -0.316**  -0.230  -0.359* -0.409  
 (0.096) (0.138)  (0.178) (0.168) (0.161)  (0.255) (0.191) (0.251) 
1-year lagged growth2 0.123***   0.158*** 0.060  0.146***     
 (0.039)   (0.051) (0.072) (0.045)     
2-year lagged growth -0.228*** -0.210**  -0.375** -0.116  -0.223*  -0.397** -0.092  -0.177  
 (0.079) (0.099)  (0.149) (0.120) (0.125)  (0.182) (0.139) (0.189) 
2-year lagged growth2 0.037**   0.038  0.024  0.057**     
 (0.018)   (0.032) (0.023) (0.023)     
Log sales 0.207* 0.160   1.337*** -0.246  0.691**  1.300*** -0.273* 0.580* 
 (0.107) (0.104)  (0.220) (0.168) (0.326)  (0.221) (0.163) (0.309) 
Log sales2 -0.007  -0.004   -0.066*** 0.010  -0.071**  -0.063*** 0.012  -0.062** 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.015) (0.014) (0.030)  (0.015) (0.014) (0.028) 
Firm age -0.081** -0.087***  0.013  -0.278*** -0.029   0.005  -0.282*** -0.037  
 (0.033) (0.033)  (0.056) (0.065) (0.052)  (0.056) (0.065) (0.052) 
Founder age 0.041  0.042   0.067  0.011  0.055   0.071  0.011  0.055  
 (0.031) (0.031)  (0.056) (0.046) (0.059)  (0.056) (0.046) (0.059) 
Founder age2 0.000  0.000   -0.001  0.000  -0.001   -0.001  0.000  -0.001  
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Male founder 0.304  0.327   0.304  0.795  -0.082   0.326  0.805  -0.048  
 (0.276) (0.276)  (0.589) (0.524) (0.391)  (0.586) (0.523) (0.392) 
Cohort dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 20,238 20,238  20,238  20,238 
Log pseudolikelihood -2413.856 -2419.771  -2866.901  -2873.061 
Pseudo R2  0.023 0.021  0.063  0.060 
Notes: The variables for founders’ education and constant terms are not reported in this table for limited space. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4. Logistic regressions for pooled exit: Below- and above-median subsamples in terms of the number of employees at the first year of observation. 
 Below-median subsample  Above-median subsample 
Variable (i) Pooled exit (ii) Pooled exit  (iii) Pooled exit (vi) Pooled exit 
1-year lagged growth -0.124  -0.124    -0.307**  -0.340* 
 (0.196) (0.183)  (0.133) (0.179) 
1-year lagged growth2 -0.035    0.143**  
 (0.073)    (0.064)   
2-year lagged growth  -0.266*  -0.289*   -0.208* -0.124  
 (0.151)  (0.149)   (0.107)  (0.134)  
2-year lagged growth2 0.021    0.068**  
 (0.029)    (0.027)   
Log sales  -0.496*  -0.478*  0.050  -0.079  
 (0.273)  (0.261)   (0.167)  (0.161)  
Log sales2 0.0624* 0.061*  0.000  0.008  
 (0.033)  (0.032)   (0.011) (0.011)  
Firm age  -0.185***  -0.188***  -0.022  -0.025  
 (0.070)  (0.068)   (0.040)  (0.040)  
Founder age -0.024  -0.023   0.053  0.055  
 (0.052)  (0.052)   (0.040)  (0.039)  
Founder age2 0.000  0.000   0.000  -0.001  
 (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
Male founder 0.450  0.453   0.188  0.224  
 (0.430)  (0.431)   (0.388)  (0.388)  
Cohort dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,334 8,334  10,728 10,728 
Log pseudolikelihood -698.512  -698.717   -1548.016  -1554.122  
Pseudo R2  0.039  0.039   0.022  0.018  
Notes: The variables for founders’ education and constant terms are not reported in this table for limited space. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5. Multinomial logistic regressions for different exit routes: Below- and above-median subsamples in terms of the number of employees at the first year 
of observation. 
  Below-median subsample  Above-median subsample 
Variable (i) Merger 
(ii) 
Voluntary 
liquidation 
(iii) 
Bankruptcy  
(iv) 
Merger 
(v) 
Voluntary 
liquidation 
(vi) 
Bankruptcy  
(vii) 
Merger 
(viii) 
Voluntary 
liquidation 
(ix) 
Bankruptcy  
(x) 
Merger 
(xi) 
Voluntary 
liquidation 
(xii) 
Bankruptcy 
1-year lagged growth  -0.781** -0.335  0.433   -0.856  -0.231  0.384   -0.229  -0.273  -0.422   -0.039  -0.385   -0.528** 
 (0.397)  (0.342)  (0.380)   (0.558)  (0.218)  (0.313   (0.218)  (0.242)  (0.257)   (0.266)  (0.292)  (0.264)  
1-year lagged growth2 0.135  -0.234  -0.046       0.126  0.117  0.112      
 (0.103)  (0.152)  (0.116)       (0.068)  (0.106)  (0.096)      
2-year lagged growth -0.417  -0.365  -0.106   -0.378   -0.345* -0.161    -0.482*** 0.096  -0.138    -0.444* 0.157  -0.073  
 (0.399)  (0.222)  (0.214)   (0.289)  (0.177)  (0.363   (0.146) (0.275)  (0.171)   (0.251)  (0.172)  (0.215)  
2-year lagged growth2 -0.043  -0.009  0.107**      0.114*** 0.017  0.047      
 (0.085)  (0.037)  (0.048)       (0.034)  (0.076)  (0.037)      
Log sales 0.812   -0.895*** 0.192   0.744   -0.803** 0.174   0.951*** -0.236  0.031   0.870*** -0.340  -0.139  
 (0.596)  (0.334)  (0.839)   (0.641)  (0.336)  (0.821   (0.282)  (0.361)  (0.414)   (0.288)  (0.331)  (0.378)  
Log sales2 -0.019  0.097** -0.028   -0.014  0.087* -0.025    -0.044** 0.004  -0.028    -0.040** 0.012  -0.015  
 (0.063)  (0.046)  (0.094)   (0.066)  (0.047)  (0.092   (0.018)  (0.027)  (0.034)   (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.030)  
Firm age -0.296   -0.332*** 0.025   -0.287   -0.315*** 0.002   0.074   -0.233*** -0.012   0.065   -0.231*** -0.013  
 (0.217)  (0.105)  (0.098)   (0.214)  (0.101)  (0.100   (0.062)  (0.088)  (0.063)   (0.061)  (0.088)  (0.063)  
Founder age -0.148  -0.082  0.198   -0.152  -0.077  0.195   0.116* 0.099  -0.034   0.119* 0.100  -0.035  
 (0.113)  (0.060)  (0.149)   (0.116)  (0.060)  (0.147   (0.068)  (0.077)  (0.063)   (0.067)  (0.076)  (0.063)  
Founder age2 0.001  0.001  -0.002   0.002  0.001  -0.002   -0.001  -0.001  0.000   -0.001  -0.001  0.000  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Male founder 0.054  1.069  -0.250   0.059  1.094  -0.235   0.272  0.944  -0.242   0.304  0.969  -0.221  
  (0.969)  (0.753)  (0.634)   (0.965)  (0.773)  (0.634   (0.727)  (0.989)  (0.521)   (0.726)  (0.991)  (0.522)  
Cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,334  8,334  10728  10728 
Log pseudolikelihood -790.645  -793.173  -1834.398  -1839.053 
Pseudo R2  0.092  0.089  0.067  0.065 
 
Notes: The variables for founders’ education and constant terms are not reported in this table for limited space. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6. Logistic and multinomial logit regression results for the full sample. 
Variable (i) Pooled exit 
(ii) 
Pooled exit  
(iii) 
Merger 
(iv) 
Voluntary 
liquidation 
(v) 
Bankruptcy 
 (vi) 
Merger 
(vii) 
Voluntary 
liquidation 
(viii) 
Bankruptcy 
Growth since startup -0.331** -0.235   -0.586*** -0.153  -0.210   -0.541** -0.114  0.038  
 (0.130) (0.148)  (0.219) (0.216) (0.198)  (0.260) (0.222) (0.277) 
Growth since startup2 0.138**   0.062  0.057  0.287***     
 (0.062)   (0.131) (0.093) (0.073)     
Log sales 0.115  0.106   1.298*** -0.347** 0.489   1.296*** -0.354** 0.446  
 (0.104) (0.105)  (0.228) (0.160) (0.307)  (0.227) (0.159) (0.304) 
Log sales2 -0.001  -0.001   -0.0636*** 0.017  -0.0560**  -0.0634*** 0.017  -0.0523* 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.016) (0.013) (0.028)  (0.016) (0.013) (0.028) 
Firm age -0.0623* -0.0664**  0.023  -0.260*** 0.003   0.022  -0.262*** -0.005  
 (0.032) (0.032)  (0.054) (0.064) (0.050)  (0.054) (0.064) (0.050) 
Founder age 0.047  0.047   0.069  0.017  0.064   0.069  0.017  0.065  
 (0.031) (0.031)  (0.055) (0.047) (0.059)  (0.055) (0.047) (0.059) 
Founder age2 0.000  0.000   -0.001  0.000  -0.001   -0.001  0.000  -0.001  
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Male founder 0.325  0.331   0.322  0.799  -0.049   0.324  0.801  -0.033  
 (0.276) (0.276)  (0.587) (0.520) (0.393)  (0.586) (0.520) (0.393) 
Cohort dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 20,238 20,238  20,238  20,238 
Log pseudolikelihood -2425.508 -2426.566  -2877.778  -2879.579 
Pseudo R2  0.019 0.018  0.059  0.058 
Notes: The variables for founders’ education and constant terms are not reported in this table for limited space. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7. Logistic regressions for pooled exit: Below- and above-median subsamples in terms of the number of employees at the first year of observation. 
 Below-median subsample  Above-median subsample 
Variable (i) Pooled exit (ii) Pooled exit  (iii) Pooled exit (vi) Pooled exit 
Growth since startup -0.160  -0.103   -0.360* -0.176  
 (0.232) (0.271)  (0.195) (0.188) 
Growth since startup2 0.109    0.188*  
 (0.092)   (0.098)  
Log sales -0.519** -0.545**  -0.125  -0.154  
 (0.258) (0.256)  (0.164) (0.165) 
Log sales2 0.0616* 0.0648**  0.011  0.013  
 (0.032) (0.032)  (0.011) (0.011) 
Firm age -0.152** -0.157**  -0.007  -0.011  
 (0.066) (0.067)  (0.039) (0.038) 
Founder age -0.016  -0.017   0.059  0.060  
 (0.052) (0.052)  (0.040) (0.040) 
Founder age2 0.000  0.000   -0.001  -0.001  
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Male founder 0.468  0.469   0.221  0.232  
 (0.435) (0.434)  (0.388) (0.388) 
Cohort dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,334 8,334  10,728 10,728 
Log pseudolikelihood -700.730  -700.944   -1556.345  -1557.131  
Pseudo R2  0.036  0.036   0.017  0.016  
Notes: The variables for founders’ education and constant terms are not reported in this table for limited space. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
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Table 8. Multinomial logistic regressions for different exit routes: Below- and above-median subsamples in terms of the number of employees at the first year of observation. 
  Below-median subsample  Above median subsample 
Variable 
(i) 
Merger 
(ii) 
Voluntary 
liquidation 
(iii) 
Bankruptcy  
(iv) 
Merger 
(v) 
Voluntary 
liquidation 
(vi) 
Bankruptcy  
(vii) 
Merger 
(viii) 
Voluntary 
liquidation 
(ix) 
Bankruptcy  
(xii) 
Merger 
(xi) 
Voluntary 
liquidation 
(x) 
Bankruptcy 
Growth since startup -0.576  -0.302  0.304   -0.673  -0.369  0.702   -0.608** 0.043  -0.183   -0.421  0.111  -0.019  
 (0.732) (0.402) (0.337)  (0.546) (0.314) (0.530)  (0.298) (0.424) (0.287)  (0.311) (0.309) (0.304) 
Growth since startup2 -0.239  -0.196  0.391***      0.201  0.060  0.178      
 (0.469) (0.262) (0.108)      (0.203) (0.177) (0.142)     
Log sales 0.445  -0.910*** 0.233   0.494  -0.866*** 0.124   0.873*** -0.477  -0.351   0.865*** -0.491  -0.417  
 (0.702) (0.329) (0.818)  (0.694) (0.324) (0.822)  (0.296) (0.366) (0.323)  (0.297) (0.354) (0.326) 
Log sales2 0.013  0.0967** -0.038   0.007  0.092** -0.026   -0.040** 0.020  0.000   -0.039** 0.021  0.004  
 (0.071) (0.047) (0.092)  (0.070) (0.047) (0.092)  (0.019) (0.027) (0.027)  (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) 
Firm age -0.244  -0.293*** 0.065   -0.233  -0.284*** 0.049   0.084  -0.227*** 0.017   0.081  -0.228*** 0.013  
 (0.193) (0.099) (0.100)  (0.195) (0.097) (0.103)  (0.060) (0.088) (0.060)  (0.059) (0.088) (0.059) 
Founder age -0.152  -0.075  0.212   -0.151  -0.073  0.213   0.117* 0.108  -0.025   0.118* 0.109  -0.025  
 (0.115) (0.061) (0.151)  (0.115) (0.060) (0.149)  (0.068) (0.077) (0.063)  (0.068) (0.077) (0.063) 
Founder age2 0.002  0.001  -0.002   0.002  0.001  -0.002   -0.001  -0.001  0.000   -0.001  -0.001  0.000  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male founder 0.036  1.102  -0.208   0.053  1.110  -0.181   0.285  0.992  -0.213   0.294  0.995  -0.201  
 (0.970) (0.766) (0.637)  (0.977) (0.774) (0.639)  (0.727) (0.990) (0.521)  (0.727) (0.990) (0.521) 
Cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,334  8,334  10,728  10,728 
Log pseudolikelihood -794.250  -795.692  -1844.734  -1845.264 
Pseudo R2  0.088  0.086  0.062  0.062 
Notes: The variables for founders’ education and constant terms are not reported in this table for limited space. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A. Distribution of log sales. 
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Figure B. Lagged growth distribution (kernel density). 
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Figure C. Survival rates for each exit route across the growth rates distribution with confidence intervals (95%). 
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Table A. Definition of variables. 
Variable Definition 
(Dependent variable)  
Pooled exit Dummy variable: 1 if the firm exits in accounting period t+1, 0 otherwise. 
Merger Dummy variable: 1 if the firm exits via merger in the t th accounting 
period, 0 otherwise. 
Voluntary liquidation Dummy variable: 1 if the firm exits via voluntary liquidation in accounting 
period t+1, 0 otherwise. 
Bankruptcy Dummy variable: 1 if the firm exits via bankruptcy in accounting period 
t+1, 0 otherwise. 
(Firm-level characteristics) 
1-year lagged growth Differences in the logarithm of sales in accounting periods t-1 and t. 
1-year lagged growth2 1-year lagged growth × 1-year lagged growth 
2-year lagged growth Differences in the logarithm of sales in accounting periods t-2 and t-1. 
2-year lagged growth2 2-year lagged growth × 2-year lagged growth 
Growth since startup Differences in the logarithm of sales in accounting period t-1 and the first 
accounting period after startup, divided by the number of years from the 
first accounting period to t-1. 
Growth since startup2 Growth since startup × Growth since startup 
Log sales Logarithm of sales in period t. 
Log sales2 Log sales × Log sales 
Firm age Number of years since the foundation. 
(Founder-level characteristics) 
Founder age Founders’ age at start-up. 
Founder age2 Founder age × founder age 
Male founder Dummy variable: 1 if the founder is male, 0 otherwise. 
Founder’s education 
(university) 
Dummy variable: 1 if the founder has university education at startup, 0 
otherwise. 
Founder’s education (unknown) Dummy variable: 1 if founder's educational background is unknown, 0 
otherwise. 
(Others)  
Cohort dummies Dummy variables for different years of establishment (2003--2010). 
Region dummies Dummy variables for different regions (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, 
Kinki, Chugoku/Shikoku, Kyushu) 
Sector dummies Dummy variables for different industries (manufacturing, information 
services, other services, movie and video production). 
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Table B. Summary statistics for independent variables used in the regressions. 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Median Max 
(Dependent variables)     
Pooled exit 0.026  0.160  0 0 1 
Merger 0.010  0.098  0 0 1 
Voluntary 0.008  0.090  0 0 1 
Bankruptcy 0.009  0.092  0 0 1 
(Independent variables)     
1-year lagged growth 0.052  0.419  -5.067  0 5.011  
1-year lagged growth2 0.178  0.705  0 0.015 25.673  
2-year lagged growth 0.159  0.583  -7.313  0.031 6.344  
2-year lagged growth2 0.365  1.365  0 0.030 53.483  
Growth since startup 0.198  0.354  0.121 -3.497  3.361  
Growth since startup2 0.165  0.441  0.028 0 12.232  
Log sales 5.177  1.747  0 4.977 13.583  
Log sales2 29.854  21.202  0 24.768 184.508  
Firm age 5.767  1.659  4 5 11 
Founder age 46.879  11.306  18 47 87 
Founder age2 2325.434  1079.293  324 2209 7569 
Male founder 0.960  0.196  0 1 1 
Founder’s education (university) 0.460  0.498  0 0 1 
Founder’s education (unknown) 0.416  0.493  0 0 1 
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Table C. Summary statistics for independent variables by status: survival, merger, voluntary liquidation, and bankruptcy. 
  Survival (N=19703)  Merger (N=196)  Voluntary liquidation (N=165)  Bankruptcy (N=174) 
Variable Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
1-year lagged growth 0.054 0.415  0.053 0.476  -0.017 0.565  -0.018 0.579 
1-year lagged growth2 0.175 0.693  0.228 0.718  0.318 1.357  0.333 1.017 
2-year lagged growth 0.160 0.581  0.082 0.613  0.169 0.710  0.111 0.697 
2-year lagged growth2 0.363 1.368  0.380 1.355  0.530 1.094  0.495 1.290 
Growth since startup 0.198  0.354   0.168  0.332   0.188  0.406   0.200  0.422  
Growth since startup2 0.164  0.442   0.138  0.420   0.199  0.369   0.217  0.451  
Log sales 5.167 1.740  6.766 1.925  4.713 1.761  4.989 1.382 
Log sales2 29.724 21.097  49.467 28.047  25.297 18.737  26.788 14.433 
Firm age 5.769 1.660  5.918 1.758  5.212 1.435  5.874 1.538 
Founder age 46.838 11.314  50.367 10.438  47.158 11.326  47.282 10.796 
Founder age2 2321.805 1079.808  2645.276 1024.300  2351.339 1063.738  2351.443 1049.669 
Male founder 0.960 0.196  0.985 0.123  0.976 0.154  0.960 0.197 
Founder’s education (university) 0.459 0.498  0.668 0.472  0.473 0.501  0.420 0.495 
Founder’s education (unknown) 0.418 0.493  0.301 0.460  0.448 0.499  0.333 0.473 
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Table D. Summary statistics for independent variables for below- and above-median subsamples in terms of the number of employees. 
  Below-median subsample (N=8,334)  Above-median subsample (N=10,728) 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max  Mean S.D. Min Max 
1-year lagged growth 0.060  0.452  -4.094  4.382   0.043  0.390  -5.067  5.011  
1-year lagged growth2 0.208  0.745  0 19.202   0.154  0.676  0 25.673  
2-year lagged growth 0.162  0.617  -7.313  5.619   0.152  0.556  -6.135  6.344  
2-year lagged growth2 0.406  1.414  0 53.483   0.332  1.337  0 40.242  
Growth since startup 0.197  0.364  -3.497  2.740   0.197  0.346  -2.518  3.361  
Growth since startup2 0.171  0.428  0 12.232   0.158  0.452  0 11.299  
Log sales 4.042  1.146  0 8.950   6.116  1.650  0 13.583  
Log sales2 17.652  9.467  0 80.103   40.126  23.269  0 184.508  
Firm age 5.579  1.564  4 11  5.922  1.719  4 11 
Founder age 44.697  11.083  18 86  48.717  11.247  20 87 
Founder age2 2120.661  1037.069  324 7396  2499.832  1091.562  400 7569 
Male founder 0.943  0.232  0 1  0.974  0.159  0 1 
Founder’s education (university) 0.447  0.497  0 1  0.478  0.500  0 1 
Founder’s education (unknown) 0.427  0.495  0 1  0.404  0.491  0 1 
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Table E. Complimentary log-log regression results. 
Variable (i) Pooled exit 
(ii) 
Pooled exit  
(iii) 
Merger 
(iv) 
Merger 
 (v) 
Voluntary 
liquidation 
(vi) 
Voluntary 
liquidation 
 (vii) 
Bankruptcy 
(viii) 
Bankruptcy 
1-year lagged growth -0.305*** -0.358***  -0.336** -0.219   -0.303* -0.348*  -0.296* -0.397  
 (0.092) (0.137)  (0.169) (0.251)  (0.170) (0.188)  (0.159) (0.249) 
1-year lagged growth2 0.106***   0.146***   0.046    0.132***  
 (0.030)   (0.044)   (0.064)   (0.040)  
2-year lagged growth -0.217*** -0.206**  -0.362** -0.391**  -0.104  -0.087   -0.210* -0.171  
 (0.075) (0.096)  (0.149) (0.178)  (0.117) (0.137)  (0.121) (0.188) 
2-year lagged growth2 0.0301**   0.031    0.018    0.0516**  
 (0.015)   (0.029)   (0.020)   (0.020)  
Log sales 0.200* 0.159   1.330*** 1.294***  -0.253  -0.273*  0.683** 0.581* 
 (0.104) (0.102)  (0.219) (0.220)  (0.165) (0.161)  (0.323) (0.308) 
Log sales2 -0.007  -0.004   -0.0652*** -0.0631***  0.010  0.011   -0.0706** -0.0623** 
 (0.008) (0.007)  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.014) (0.013)  (0.030) (0.028) 
Firm age -0.0795** -0.0858***  0.015  0.008   -0.277*** -0.280***  -0.027  -0.034  
 (0.033) (0.033)  (0.056) (0.055)  (0.065) (0.065)  (0.052) (0.052) 
Founder age 0.041  0.042   0.067  0.070   0.010  0.010   0.054  0.055  
 (0.031) (0.031)  (0.055) (0.055)  (0.046) (0.046)  (0.059) (0.058) 
Founder age2 0.000  0.000   -0.001  -0.001   0.000  0.000   -0.001  -0.001  
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Male founder 0.300  0.323   0.301  0.323   0.793  0.802   -0.091  -0.059  
  (0.273) (0.273)  (0.586) (0.582)  (0.518) (0.518)  (0.391) (0.391) 
Cohort dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 20,238 20,238  20,238 20,238  20,238 20,238  20,238 20,238 
Log pseudolikelihood -2414.390  -2419.763   -993.854  -995.857   -920.319  -920.702   -957.853  -961.106  
Notes: The variables for founders’ education and constant terms are not reported in this table for limited space. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
